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NOMINATIONS OF GENERAL PAUL X. KELLEY, RICHARD L. ARMITAGE, AND CHAPMAN B. COX

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

NOMINATIONS OF
GENERAL PAUL X. KELLEY TO BE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

RICHARD L. ARMITAGE TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)

CHAPMAN B. COX TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS)

MAY 24, 1983

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CONTENTS

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

	Page
Dole, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator from the State of Kansas	2
Armitage, Richard L	4
Kelley, Gen. Paul X	19
Kennedy, Hon. Edward M., U.S. Senator from the State of Massachusetts	19
Warner, Hon. John W., U.S. Senator from the State of Virginia	30
Cox, Chapman B	30

NOMINATIONS OF GEN. PAUL X. KELLEY, RICHARD L. ARMITAGE, AND CHAPMAN B. COX

TUESDAY, MAY 24, 1983

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:12 p.m., in room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator John Tower (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Tower, Thurmond, Warner, Wilson, Stennis, Nunn, and Kennedy.

Staff present: James F. McGovern, staff director and chief counsel; James G. Roche, minority staff director; Alan R. Yuspeh, general counsel; Paul C. Besozzi, minority counsel; Christine C. Dauth, chief clerk; Brenda K. Hudson, assistant chief clerk; Patrick A. Tucker, counsel; James R. Locher III, David S. Lyles, and José E. Martinez, professional staff members; Drew A. Harker, research assistant; Ann E. Sauer, special assistant; Gerald D. Strickler, printing and documents clerk; and Jacquie S. O'Grady, staff assistant.

Also present: Dennis P. Sharon, assistant to Senator Goldwater; John Campbell, assistant to Senator Warner; Ron Kelly, assistant to Senator Humphrey; Jim Dykstra, assistant to Senator Cohen; Jon Etherton, assistant to Senator Jepsen; Frank Sullivan, assistant to Senator Stennis; Arnold L. Punaro, assistant to Senator Nunn; Bill Lind, assistant to Senator Hart; Greg Pallas, assistant to Senator Exon; Peter D. Lennon, assistant to Senator Levin; and Joe Kruzel, assistant to Senator Kennedy.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN TOWER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman TOWER. The committee will come to order.

The committee meets this afternoon to consider three statutory nominations—Gen. Paul X. Kelley to be Commandant of the Marine Corps, Richard L. Armitage to be Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), and Chapman B. Cox to be Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs).

In addition, we will consider a number of routine military nominations and two resolutions of commendation for prior staff members.

We are pleased to have with us today Senator Dole who will present one of the nominees to the committee. Due to the press of his business and trying to discover various painless ways to achieve revenue enhancement—which is a new term for taxes—I think we should let him go first and present Mr. Richard Armitage. Mr. Armitage is

nominated to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

So, we shall proceed out of order and have Senator Dole and Mr. Armitage before the committee first.

[The nomination reference and biographical sketch of Mr. Armitage follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
April 26, 1983.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

Richard Lee Armitage, of Virginia, to be an Assistant Secretary of Defense, vice Francis J. West, resigned.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF RICHARD LEE ARMITAGE

Richard Lee Armitage was appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs for East Asia and Pacific Affairs on February 8, 1981.

Mr. Armitage was born April 26, 1945 in Boston, Massachusetts. He attended high school in Atlanta, Georgia before entering the U.S. Naval Academy. Upon graduation from the Naval Academy in 1967, he earned a B.S. degree in Engineering and was commissioned an Ensign in the United States Navy. Mr. Armitage was initially assigned to a U.S. Navy destroyer engaged in operations off the coast of Vietnam; he subsequently served three in-country tours in Vietnam and an assignment as counterinsurgency instructor at the Naval Amphibions School.

Mr. Armitage resigned from the Navy in 1973 to accept an advisory position with the U.S. Defense Attache Office in Saigon. In 1975, he returned to the Pentagon as a consultant and subsequently served on the staff of the U.S. Defense Representative to Iran. From 1976 to 1978, he pursued business interests in Southeast Asia. In March 1978, he became Administrative Assistant to Senator Robert Dole of Kansas, a position he left in May 1979 to establish a Washington-based consulting firm specializing in Southeast Asian affairs.

Mr. Armitage worked in the Foreign Policy office of the Reagan presidential campaign and later was named as a member of the National Security Transition Team. He lives in Fairfax, Virginia, with his wife, Laura; three daughters, Elizabeth, Lee, and Jenny; one son, Paul; and two foster children.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROBERT DOLE, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF KANSAS

Senator DOLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We are in the process—I am not certain I would put it quite the way you did.

Chairman TOWER. I hope I put it wrong.

Senator DOLE. Right. We don't want to raise taxes, just enough to take care of this committee and its needs. [Laughter.]

Chairman TOWER. That will be all right.

Senator DOLE. I want to thank the distinguished chairman.

What I thought I might do is ask that my statement be made a part of the record.

I have known Rich Armitage for a long time. He worked in my office for over a year, left and started his own consulting firm. I have watched Rich's career with interest. He is not a Kansan, so I am not trying to promote Kansans. If there are any in the room, I would like to say a good word for them.

Rich Armitage was born in Massachusetts, attended high school in Georgia, and is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy. He is no stranger to Congress. I think that is going to serve him well when he is confirmed as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

He has been before this committee and other committees a number of times as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia and Pacific Affairs in the International Security Affairs Office he is now nominated to head.

I will just indicate for the record, Mr. Chairman, that I do know Rich Armitage. He is an outstanding American. He is knowledgeable and competent and dedicated as much as any person I have known to have dedication. Certainly he shares a deep concern for this country and its liberty and our national security.

I wanted to come over this afternoon and indicate my strong support for the nominee because of my friendship with the nominee, but above and beyond that, my feeling and my deep conviction that Rich Armitage will do a good job.

[The prepared statement of Senator Dole follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR BOB DOLE

I think the distinguished chairman, and Members of the Armed Services Committee, for this opportunity to appear before you today and introduce Mr. Richard L. Armitage, who has been nominated by President Reagan for the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

Mr. Armitage was born, not in Kansas, but in Boston, Massachusetts. He attended high school in Atlanta, Georgia and is a graduate of the United States Naval Academy.

Mr. Armitage is no stranger to Congress. Many of you knew him—and I relied heavily on him—as my administrative assistant in 1978–1979. During that time he overcame the handicap of not being a native of the great State of Kansas, making it possible for me to recommend him to you today. During the past two years he has appeared before various committees as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia and Pacific Affairs in the International Security Affairs Office he is now nominated to head.

It has been said that the best policy makers are those who have been implementors rather than theoriticians. They bring to policy deliberations a concern and understanding for the task of those who must put the policies into action and a keen appreciation for what really works.

By this criterion as by virtually any other, Mr. Armitage is unquestionably qualified for the position to which he has been nominated. He has been at the cutting edge of United States security policies in Southeast Asia and in Iran. In Vietnam, he served three and one-half tours of duty as a naval officer and two years in a civilian advisory position with the U.S. Defense Attache Office in Saigon. Later, he was a member of the staff of the U.S. Defense Representative to Iran. His follow-on experience in Asia as a businessman and subsequently in the foreign policy apparatus of the administration make him ideally suited to the task at hand.

Mr. Armitage is an outstanding American, knowledgeable, competent and dedicated to maintaining our national security while preserving American values in the conduct of our international affairs.

Mr. Chairman, it is indeed a pleasure to appear before you on behalf of Rich Armitage. I sincerely hope that the Members of this committee will agree with my assessment of his credentials and act favorably on his nomination.

Thank you very much.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you very much, Senator Dole.

I would like to note for the record that Mr. Armitage has met with the staff of the committee to review his financial holdings and to insure that he will be in compliance with our committee's requirements so as

to avoid any conflict of interest between his or his family's finances and his Government responsibilities.

I would further state for the record that Mr. Armitage has agreed to divest himself of any financial interest which he or his wife has in any defense contractors. Accordingly, he appears to be in full accord with Federal laws regarding conflict of interest.

Mr. Armitage, we are pleased to have you with us today and the committee would be glad to hear whatever remarks you would like to make at this time.

STATEMENT OF RICHARD L. ARMITAGE

Mr. ARMITAGE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to make a brief statement.

It is a great honor for me and a humbling experience to appear before you and to have had the President of the United States accept the Secretary of Defense's recommendation in nominating me to this post. I would have to say I am equally honored Senator Dole would take time from his extraordinarily busy schedule to come and introduce me to the committee.

He might want to take credit as my mentor in Washington. He introduced me to politics Washington style and I am immensely grateful.

I come from being Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs. That is Pacific in fact as well as its name. It is with a good deal of trepidation that as I try to enlarge my horizons. I look around at seething caldrons like the Middle East, and wonder if this is a job to be relished. Nevertheless, it is a job that has to be done.

I noticed as I started my study for this position that as I looked at the Middle East first I saw it was a victim of three kinds of problems, external aggression as evidenced in Afghanistan, interregional conflict as characterized by the Israeli-Arab conflict, indeed internal instability as has been characterized by Iran's attempt to overthrow the Government of the Bahrain as part of its fundamentalist crusade against its neighbors, and Qadhafi's mischief making in the Western Sahara and elsewhere.

There is no desire or mandate on our part to be the policeman in the region. Our interest is served by the peaceful development of economic and social conditions in Africa and assistance as Africa develops political and economic initiatives.

Unfortunately the Soviets do promote instability in the region. If you look around, you see Chad, Ethiopia, Angola, and South Yemen as examples.

As I turn to our own hemisphere, our major national interests are at stake as we are attempting to frustrate the spread of the revolution without frontiers in Nicaragua south to the Canal and north to Mexico.

Mr. Chairman, it is with a great deal of trepidation that I approach these days and also with a great deal of dedication and, I hope zeal, that I will apply myself to the task at hand.

I would say just to echo Senator Dole's words that I hope that my last 2 years as Deputy Assistant Secretary and the consultation that was necessary with the Hill on that job, plus my own work on the Hill as Senator Dole's administrative assistant gave me an appreciation of

the proper role of Congress and how the administration should interact with the Congress, both the Members and the staff. I hope to serve you well.

Sir, I have a statement which I will ask permission to provide for the record.

I stand by for questions.

Chairman TOWER. We will have your statement inserted in the record in its entirety.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Armitage follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD L. ARMITAGE

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I am deeply honored by Secretary Weinberger's recommendation and President Reagan's nomination of me to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. If confirmed, I hope to carry out the responsibilities of that office in a way which will be worthy of their—and your—trust and confidence.

I feel further honored by the kind introduction of my former boss, Senator Dole. My experience as a member of his staff gave me a keen appreciation of the potential for close cooperation between Congress and the administration and the need for frequent and candid consultations to sustain it. In my more recent experience as a member of the administration, I have become ever more cognizant of the need for consensus and collaboration between Congress and the executive branch on important issues and programs if we are to institute and sustain successful national policies.

Since I am being promoted from the ranks, so to speak, I have the advantage of being familiar with the current situation and most of the ongoing defense interests and issues in those regions of the world for which the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs has responsibilities. As an initial contribution to what I hope will be a rich and continuing dialogue with Congress if I am confirmed, I would like to share with you my assessment of the current state of United States security interests in the regions of the world outside of Europe.

United States interests span the entire world. They have shifted from being largely Euro-centered to reflect our growing interdependence with other regions. And, they have become more sensitive to the needs and concerns of Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America.

The growing economic and political influence of the former colonies of the Third World has increased the number of independent actors who count on the world stage. At the same time, the national and multinational economies which constitute the world economic system have become more interdependent.

As the world has become more diverse and interdependent, the international interests of the United States have become more truly global. Our trade with Asia and the Pacific now surpasses that with Europe. The fastest growing export market for United States' products is Latin America. We are dependent for raw materials, including strategic materials needed by our defense industries, on trade with nations of Africa, Asia and Latin America.

The cultural heritage of the American people remains predominantly European, but even that is changing. Black Americans have long been proud of their African heritage. Now, a growing percentage of Americans trace their roots to Asia and Latin America.

Moreover, jet travel and modern communications have made Americans more aware of their responsibilities as citizens of the world. We have acquired more global interests as a Nation because our citizens have become more interested and concerned about what is happening elsewhere in the world. Famine in Bangladesh, apartheid in South Africa, genocide in Kampuchea, terrorism in Italy, and political oppression wherever it occurs are matters of United States interest because they offend the sense of justice and humanity of the American people.

A world of diversity is not hostile environment for United States interests. We are not threatened by it. On the contrary, our own domestic experience is that of compromise and accommodation among the disparate groups which make up our Nation. Accustomed to dealing with diversity, we can pursue our interests peacefully and with confidence in such a world.

22-463 O - 83 - 2

Unfortunately, that is not true of our major adversary. The main claim to power of the Soviet rulers is that they have the one true interpretation of the Communist ideology. They cannot admit that someone else's point of view might have merit. They cannot tolerate diversity among nations without legitimizing the right of their own people to differ with the party line or of their various nationalities to express their own national identities. Therefore, their imperialistic ambition is to remake the world in their own dismal image.

The Soviet ambition has always been there. What has changed is the ability of Soviet military power to back that ambition with the threat or use of force in far flung locations around the world.

The shift in the balance of power brought about by the tremendous growth of Soviet military strength and the geographic expansion of Soviet influence increasingly threatens the achievement of U.S. foreign policy goals. Although the U.S. has lived under the threat of Soviet nuclear attack for three decades, the conventional threat for many years was confined principally to the periphery of the USSR. In recent years, increased Soviet military capabilities combined with increased confidence from that military buildup have enabled the Soviet Union to seize opportunities to expand its influence, either directly or through surrogates, in many parts of the world.

The threat encompasses all mission areas. Soviet ships and planes enjoy access to far flung ports and airfields (in Cuba, Vietnam, Ethiopia, and elsewhere). Soviet military supplies fuel conflicts in almost every region of the world (in the hands of Vietnamese in Kampuchea, Syrians in Lebanon, Libyans in Chad, and guerrillas in El Salvador, among others). Soviet strategic force improvements have eliminated our advantage in nuclear forces; conventional weapons improvements have steadily eroded our qualitative advantage. We pursue our foreign policy goals in an increasingly unstable environment where a growing number of nations, allied and non-aligned alike, are threatened by Soviet and surrogate military coercion.

My stress on the importance of non-European interests and threats should not obscure the fact that American and West European security remain indivisible. European and American partnership is still the centerpiece of our efforts to deter Soviet aggression and to build a more stable and constructive relationship with Moscow. The vital importance of the security of Western Europe to our own security has not diminished. But our security interests in other parts of the world are much more important now than when the Soviet Union was only a continental power and world affairs were more compartmented.

The East Asia and Pacific region has vital economic importance to the United States. Japan is our second largest trading partner, second only to Canada. Asia and Pacific nations account for more of our trade (30%) than ony other region. The sea lanes over which this trade passes are essential to the survival of Japan and critical to the continued prosperity of the United States and its Asian friends and allies.

The importance of the region is demonstrated by the fact that five of the United States' seven defense agreements are located there. They include treaties with Japan, Korea and the Philippines, the Manila Pact which adds Thailand to our treaty partners, and the ANZUS Treaty. Each of these agreements is more important today than on the day it was signed.

Today, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, with Soviet materiel and financial support, continues its occupation of Kampuchea. Some of its forces directly threaten the area near the Thai-Kampuchean border. North Korea continues an unprecedented military buildup far beyond its defensive requirements. Its leadership remains committed to the reunification of the Peninsula under Communist rule. Active insurgencies continue in Thailand and the Philippines.

But the most far reaching military development of recent years has been the dramatic increase of Soviet offiensive power in East Asia and the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Soviet military forces in the Pacific for the first time pose a significant direct conventional threat to U.S. forces, territory and lines of communication. The Soviets now have and are steadily improving the capability to bring the war to us by attacking our forward deployed forces, our supply lines, and our territory in Guam and the Aleutians. Furthermore, Soviet power projection capability poses a real and growing threat to our friends and allies in the region.

Much of the growth of Soviet offensive power which has brought this about occurred in the last ten years—most of it in the last three. The Soviets now have a limited but growing multiple-option capability which I would label "Flexible Response" if I were not convinced of the Soviet willingness to use it in aggression

rather than response. This new "Flexible Aggression" capability of the Soviets is a fundamental change in the security context in which our policies must work in our relations with the countries of East Asia.

We have not been idle. Modest increases in U.S. forces have been carried out. More significantly, we have put more modern equipment in the hands of U.S. forces both ashore and afloat and increased our ability to sustain those forces in combat. Having demonstrated our determination to remain a Pacific power, we have encouraged our friends and allies to do more in their own defense so that collectively we can resist Soviet intimidation.

The current situation is encouraging. Japan has acknowledged as its appropriate role the defense of Japan itself and its air and sea lanes out to 1000 miles, though the Japanese have not yet applied the resources required to achieve this capability during this decade. The Republic of Korea continues to strengthen its defenses aided by U.S. security assistance. The ASEAN states maintain a solid front against Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea. The South Pacific Island nations are resisting Soviet attempts to gain access. Australia and New Zealand contribute to the stability of Southeast Asia, support our efforts in the Indian Ocean and, with Fiji, provide part of the Sinai Multinational Force and Observers (the MFO) which helps carry out the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty of 1979. China is opposed to Soviet efforts to expand its influence, supportive of ASEAN initiatives in Southeast Asia, and committed to maintenance of peace and stability in the region. As a result, Vietnam and North Korea remain isolated in the area and the Soviets so far have been unable to translate their growing military power into increased political influence among the East Asian and Pacific nations.

Moving west, we come to the region of greatest instability in the world today, the Greater Middle East. This region, stretching from Morocco to Pakistan, is troubled by three types of threats:

First, the threat of external aggression, exemplified by Soviet efforts to bomb and gas the Afghan people into submission. The war of resistance ignited by the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan has spilled over into Pakistan, resulting in border raids and over 2.8 million refugees.

Second, the threat of intra-regional conflict. The Iran-Iraq war is in its third year, and continues as a potential threat to the flow of Persian Gulf oil to world markets. Soviet-supported South Yemen endangers not only North Yemen but Oman and Saudi Arabia as well. The Arab-Israeli conflict remains at the center of Regional instability. The failure of Syria, supported by the USSR, to accept the agreement worked out by Secretary Shultz for withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon, threatens renewed conflict in the area as well as our initiatives for a negotiated solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Third is the threat of internal instability exploited by subversion, such as Iran's attempt to overthrow the government of Bahrain as part of its fundamentalist crusade against its neighbors, and Qadhafi's mischief-making in the Western Sahara and elsewhere.

To address the external threat, President Reagan in December 1982 approved the formation of a new unified defense command for the region. USCENTCOM's primary purpose is to deter Soviet aggression by being prepared to deploy sufficient forces quickly enough to deny the Soviets the option of a blitzkrieg to control access to Persian Gulf oil.

Our efforts to resolve intra-regional disputes have centered on the Arab-Israeli conflict. Our pursuit of a just and lasting solution to this problem requires our continued commitment to Israel's security and survival. It also requires that we maintain and strengthen our relations with other friendly moderate states in the region.

In recent months, the President has frequently reaffirmed three points about our policies.

First is our firm determination to continue the search for peace begun at Camp David and renewed in the President's September 1982 initiative. This initiative would provide security both for Israel and for other nations in the region. And, it would address, in the words of Secretary Shultz, "the legitimate needs and problems of the Palestinian people."

Second is our commitment to work to achieve complete withdrawal of all foreign troops from Lebanon—including those of Israel, Syria, and the PLO. This is essential to stability in the area and is vital to Lebanon once again taking its place as a sovereign nation.

Third is our fundamental perception that a lasting peace achieved through direct negotiations is the best guarantee of long-term security for Israel and its neighbors.

South of the Sahara, United States interests are important, but limited compared with some other regions. Unlike the Soviet Union, the United States does not see its economic and political interests in Africa served by local arms races or by instability. We have no mandate and no desire to be Africa's policeman. Our interests are best served by political and economic stability and the peaceful development of African economic and political institutions which can interact with our own to mutual advantage. Our goal is to discourage outside interference in African affairs.

The Soviets, however, promote instability and encourage violent solutions to local conflicts to spread their own influence and access, reduce ours, and disrupt Western and Japanese access to vital sources of strategic raw materials. There are about 2,500 Soviet bloc military advisors and upwards of 10,000 Cuban troops in Ethiopia. Vast quantities of Soviet arms have made the Ethiopian armed forces the largest and one of the best equipped in sub-Saharan Africa. In 1981, Ethiopia signed a treaty with Libya and South Yemen which has led to Libyan and Ethiopian cooperation in subversion and armed attacks against both Sudan and Somalia. Qadhafi is also meddling in the affairs of numerous other sub-Saharan states, most notably Chad, which is trying to overcome the effects of years of civil war.

Castro's African intervention is not confined to Ethiopia either. He is also providing over 20,000 combat troops and advisors to Angola in return for which he receives almost $300 million per year in oil, ten percent of Angola's GNP.

Instability and insecurity frustrate peaceful development. And it is only through peaceful development that Africa will find solutions to the critical social and economic challenges it faces. But the solution to conflicts in Africa does not rest with U.S. abstinence while others rush in to exploit regional strife. Especially when insecurity is fueled by external forces, we promote African interests as well as our own by helping our African friends resist and overcome it.

The dangers posed to African stability by Castro's soldiers are pale in comparison to those Cuba poses in our own hemisphere. With Soviet support, Castro has grown from a bombastic nuisance into a dangerous adversary. Cuba is a Soviet base with impressive capabilities. It is sobering to note that 50 percent of our overseas trade products and crude oil imports pass through the Caribbean within range of Soviet and Cuban forces. In the event of a conflict in Eurasia, we face the possibility of a nasty fight right off our own shoreline.

Within Central America, Castro continues to plot and aid subversion in Guatamala, El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica and Colombia. He has 5,000 Cuban technicians and advisors in Nicaragua which is the command, control and supply base for Central American guerrilla operations. Cubans and East Germans are constructing Soviet-model airfields for hefty, long-range aircraft in Nicaragua and on the southern Caribbean island of Grenada.

Major national interests of the United States are at stake in Central America and the key is the struggle in El Salvador. The government there is reforming itself into a democracy—perhaps not as quickly as we would like, but in fact reforming. It is threatened by an externally-supported military force, not a ragged band of modern Robin Hoods. If we permit that government to be knocked off through force of arms by an armed minority which does not have the support of the people, then no government on the isthmus is safe. Nicaragua's Cuban and Soviet-supported "Revolution without Frontiers" would spread. It would head south across Costa Rica which has no army, toward the canal. It would head north putting enormous pressures on Honduras, increasing the tempo of the guerrilla war in Guatamala, and moving toward the Mexican border.

Lest you think these observations overblown and alarmist, let me point out that Nicaragua now has the largest armed forces in the history of Central America. The Sandinista army is still growing and is equipped with East German trucks, Soviet antiaircraft guns and artillery, and even some 50 Soviet tanks. The disparity with the forces of Nicaragua's neighbors is unwarranted by any stretch of the imagination and seriously threatens regional balance and stability.

Although our immediate concerns are focused on Central America, we cannot afford to forget about subversive activities elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere. In South America, Cuba is training cadres and providing support to many terrorist organizations, including Colombia's M–19, Uruguay's Tupamaros, Argentina's Montenceros and Chile's MIR. In Peru, Soviet military assistance as

well as the recent outbreak of terrorist activity are other causes for concern.

There is no doubt about the root causes of the situation in Central America. The frustrations and frictions that are exploited by the communists unquestionably arise from underlying social, political and economic problems. Therefore, our strategy to prevent a Marxist-Leninist outcome in Central America is political, not military. It includes economic assistance and our insistence on political and economic reform and the protection of human rights. It also includes the Caribbean Basin Initiative which will promote a better economic future for the region, and the search for a peaceful solution. But the military component, while ancillary, is essential to give the other components of the strategy time and a stable and secure environment in which to work.

The common element in most of the global "hot spots" I have mentioned is the involvement of the Soviet Union or Soviet-supported nations. As the principal arms supplier to Libya, Ethiopia, Cuba, Vietnam, Syria and the puppet regime in Afghanistan, the Soviets have either provoked or taken advantage of regional tensions and seized upon existing divisions and vulnerabilities wherever they exist to advance their own interests.

We certainly do not want to see more of the world's people subjugated by totalitarian rule. But it is not simply altruism—not "helping those people over there" simply because we are champions of the underdog—that will determine whether or not we would become involved in an overseas conflict. It is also the cold rational calculation of the vital importance of the security of other parts of the world to our own that underlies our policies and commitments. The interdependence of our interests with those of our friends and allies makes it demonstrably to our benefit to help them deter, and if necessary defeat threats to their security.

A strong and visible U.S. defense capability to protect its interests whenever they are threatened is now all the more essential throughout the world to prevent the intimidation of our friends and allies by the Soviets and to assure those nations who share our values or interests that America's commitments remain firm. The renewed commitment of the American Government and the American people to do what it takes to insure our defense has started to make a difference. We must not waiver in our determination to see the efforts we have started through to completion.

In a global security assessment, we should not lose sight of our own strengths. We have important advantages in our efforts to prevent the Soviets from transforming their increased military power into greater political influence. The Soviets believe that a country must be remolded in their image if it is to be a reliable friend. Those who are not "reliable friends" must be intimidated by military power. Our interests, however, are not threatened by true independence and diversity. Our policies support independence, strengthen the capabilities and confidence of our allies and friends to resist intimidation, and do so without demanding conformity. Our forward deployments and the readiness and mobility we are building in our other forces offer reassurance that we can come to the aid of our friends against external threats which are too big for them to handle alone.

With the support of the American people and the United States Congress, and working together with our friends and allies, we can meet the global Soviet challenge.

Chairman TOWER. Mr. Armitage, will you agree to appear before this committee any time that you are summoned to testify on matters related to your area of responsibility?

Mr. ARMITAGE. I will, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Mr. Armitage, I have a few questions I would like to submit to you for response for the record in writing.

I will turn now to Senator Kennedy. Or do you want to defer to Senator Wilson?

Senator KENNEDY. I will defer.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Wilson?

Senator WILSON. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

I am pleased with Mr. Armitage's background and his statement today and have no questions.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Kennedy?

Senator KENNEDY. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Mr. Armitage, you got off the hook easy today.

Mr. ARMITAGE. That is an auspicious start, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Your reputation has preceded you. I think you are well recommended for this job. I expect the committee will vote to favorably report your nomination.

We thank you for your appearance.

Mr. ARMITAGE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[Questions with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY CHAIRMAN TOWER, ANSWERS SUPPLIED BY MR. ARMITAGE

SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITY

Chairman TOWER. From the perspective of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), what are the most disturbing trends in the international security environment?

Mr. ARMITAGE. As I indicated in the statement I submitted for the record, the most disturbing trend in the international security environment is the continuing growth of the military capability of the Soviet Union. The Soviet imperialistic ambition to remake the world in its own dismal image is increasingly backed by the ability of Soviet military power to threaten or use force in far flung locations around the world.

The shift in the balance of power brought about by the tremendous growth of Soviet military strength and the geographic expansion of Soviet influence increasingly threatens the achievement of U.S. foreign policy goals. Although the U.S. has lived under the threat of Soviet nuclear attack for three decades, the conventional threat for many years was confined principally to the periphery of the USSR. In recent years, increased Soviet military capabilities combined with increased confidence from that military buildup have enabled the Soviet Union to seize opportunities to expand its influence, either directly or through surrogates, in many parts of the world.

The threat encompasses all mission areas. Soviet ships and planes enjoy access to far flung ports and airfields (in Cuba, Vietnam, Ethiopia, and elsewhere). Soviet military supplies fuel conflicts in almost every region of the world (in the hands of Vietnamese in Kampuchea, Syrians in Lebanon, Libyans in Chad, and guerrillas in El Salvador, among others). Soviet strategic force improvements have eliminated our advantage in nuclear forces; conventional weapons improvements have steadily eroded our qualitative advantage. We pursue our foreign policy goals in an increasingly unstable environment where a growing number of nations, allied and non-aligned alike, are threatened by Soviet and surrogate military coercion. And, when former friends of the Soviet Union attempt to liberalize their policies, they risk military intervention as in Afghanistan.

COUNTERING UNFAVORABLE TRENDS

Chairman TOWER. How should the United States seek to counter these unfavorable trends?

Mr. ARMITAGE. A strong and visible U.S. defense capability to protect its interests wherever they are threatened is now all the more essential throughout the world to prevent the intimidation of our friends and allies by the Soviets and to assure those nations who share our values or interests that America's commitments remain firm. The renewed commitment of the American government and the American people to do what it takes to ensure our defense has started to make a difference. We must not waiver in our determination to see the efforts we have started through to completion.

The United States has made the tough political decisions to allocate the resources that we must have for defense. We have improved the readiness and sustainability of U.S. forces and begun a force buildup and modernization effort. But the United States cannot halt Soviet global expansion by itself. And although the Soviet Union is the most prominent threat, we recognize that our interests and those of our allies can be put in jeopardy by actions of other expansionist nations. Our allies are more important than ever in the common defense against growing threats to our security and freedom. It is essential that

we revitalize our alliances and that all partners contribute more to the collective defense. This is the heart of the Reagan administration's roles and missions policy.

Our security assistance program is an essential complement to these efforts. It assures base rights and access which are needed for a strong and visible U.S. capability to defend its interests. It also provides the financial support for which many of our friends and allies look to the United States in their efforts to strengthen their military capabilities and their ability to contribute more to the common defense.

All of these elements—continued strengthening of U.S. military capabilities, increased contributions to the common defense by friends and allies, and an adequate U.S. security assistace program—are essential to our efforts to counter the adverse trends which devolve from the continued buildup of Soviet military power.

CRITICAL IN AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY

Chairman TOWER. What are the most critical problems in the areas of responsibility of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)?

Mr. ARMITAGE. International Security Affairs has responsibility for developing and monitoring the execution of defense policy in four of the five major regions of the world (East Asia and the Pacific, Near East, and Southwest Asia, Africa, and Inter-America) and is responsible for policy for Special Operations Forces and for International Economics and Energy Affairs.

The most critical problems in East Asia and Pacific Region are:

In the absence of major crises in the relatively stable and peaceful East Asia and Pacific Region, we have difficulty motivating ourselves as well as our allies—notably Japan—to allocate to Asian defense capabilities resources commensurate with the importance of our interests there and the threat of growing Soviet, North Korean, and Vietnamese military power.

Another critical challenge in Asia is how to develop further and strengthen the type of limited defense relationship with the People's Republic of China which would serve our mutual interests while fulfilling our obligations to insure the security of the people of Taiwan .

In the Near East and Southwest Asia our critical problems are:

Development and execution of policy and actions concerning our political-military relationship with the countries involved in the Arab-Israel confrontation. This includes coordination with the Department of State and other concerned agencies on the providing of weaponry, training and funding assistance, to individual countries to help insure their security as well being.

Support for the long-standing U.S. objective of helping Lebanon to achieve stability, sovereignty and control of all of its territory, free from external interference. This involves the presence of U.S. forces as part of the four-nation Multinational Force; management of a large-scale security assistance program to upgrade, equip and train the Lebanese Armed Forces; and military advisory support for the negotiating teams of Ambassadors Habib and Draper.

Development of policy and planning necessary to insure U.S., and our other allies such as NATO and Japan, access to the petroleum resources of the Middle East. This includes development of basing rights, accesses to necessary facilities and the overall U.S. political-military relationship with nations in the area to prevent Soviet or Soviet sponsored hegemony in the area.

In Africa we face the threat of endemic conflict and instability which is caused by a combination of ethnic, racial, religious, and ideological differences compounded by pervasive poverty and weak government institutions. These problems set the stage for three more obvious and direct threats: the penetration of the Soviets and their surrogates, the increasing influence of inimical regional states, such as Libya and Ethiopia, and regional conflicts. These four threats are interwoven and often mutually reinforcing.

Our most critical problems in Latin America are:

In Central America and the Caribbean, the United States faces a growing Cuban/Soviet sponsored insurgency which uses Nicaragua as its focal point to promote " a revolution without frontiers throughout Central America." U.S. aid to the Governments of El Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica is critical to the successful resolution of this problem. In conjunction with the Department of State and the Office of Management and Budget, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs manages the Defense secu-

rity assistance to this region and actively participates in the development of new policy recommendations.

Relations with South America: The South Atlantic conflict between Argentina and the UK strained U.S. relations with Latin America and created uncertainty regarding U.S. long-range regional policy goals. The potential for instability in the region and for states hostile to U.S. interests exploiting the situation to gain access to strategic locations has increased. We are developing and pursuing policies designed to rebuild the cooperative relations and to store and reassert U.S. influence with our South American neighbors while reinforcing the rule of law and peaceful resolution of disputes principles.

Additionally, I believe that capable Special Operations Forces are essential to U.S. national security. After a decade of neglect in the 1970s, the revitalization of those forces is one of our highest priorities.

Finally, a critical problem facing ISA is the financial condition of the lesser developed countries we rely on as allies. The heavy debt service burdens of these countries have necessitated stringent austerity programs which are curtailing growth and causing internal unrest. Thus, economic forces have established the conditions which can destabilize the governments we support. Because of ISA's security and financial ties with these countries, we have a definite interest in both their military and economic problems. ISA must now tailor individual assistance programs to fit both the security and the financial requirements of the recipient—attempting to work the fine line between appropriate security support and reasonable economic capability.

DIFICIENCIES IN U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

Chairman TOWER. What deficiencies do you see in U.S. National Security Strategy or in the strategic planning process?

Mr. ARMITAGE. The United States recognizes that a fundamental strength of the international system—closely paralleling our own domestic political system—is the tolerance and accommodation of a diversity of viewpoints and interests. Our policy apparatus and strategic planning process is designed to accept and support this fundamental reality while pursuing U.S. National Interests within a broad, flexible framework. Our basic National Interests, therefore, are more often best served by maintaining a high degree of flexibility in the development of our national security policy and strategy—a fact that conflicts with the need to sell that policy by simple, direct explanations to the American people, and other interested audiences. One problem, then, is our inability to adequately communicate the true essence of U.S. National Security Policy in a way that will win a broad and lasting base of support from the nation at large.

In addition, the internal diversity that is one of our strengths can also create great problems in the defense policy making process. Various power centers and interest groups within our political and social system keep pulling our policy in different directions and keep friends, allies and potential adversaries wondering whether we can develop and sustain a cohesive, consistent policy.

Finally, in a different vein, a strategy-resources mismatch exists today and will continue to exist for years to come. One of our most difficult challenges is finding ways to minimize the risks inherent in having too few resources (forces, equipment, money) to adequately support our foreign and defense policy commitments.

INADEQUATE SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Chairman TOWER. Do you believe that the United States has given sufficient emphasis to security assistance programs? In what cases, if any, are U.S. security assistance efforts inadequate?

Mr. ARMITAGE. As a nation, we are not giving sufficient emphasis to our security assistance programs. We are not funding security assistance at the levels and in the ways needed to support our national strategy.

This administration is convinced that a strong, coherent, and reliable security assistance program, adequately funded by Congress, is an absolutely essential complement to our efforts to strengthen America's defenses. Our assistance programs help us maintain foreign bases, gain access to overseas facilities, improve our ability to operate with other armed forces, and, in general, improve the forward defense of the United States. To maintain the security of the United States, our allies, and our SLOCs against the growing Soviet threat and to maintain regional security in the various regions of the world, we rely principally on

our friends and allies to meet local threats while maintaining forward deployed and rapidly deployable U.S. forces to fulfill our commitments to our allies and to meet the Soviet threat. This strategy requires that we and our friends and allies do more to provide for the common defense. Those who can are being urged, with some success, to do so with their own resources. Others, however, legitimately look to us for financial support to assist their efforts.

For most of the world, support for the efforts of our friends and allies provided by U.S. security assistance is inadequate for them to improve their military capabilities as we are urging them to do. Several things contribute to this. First, the administration is restrained by fiscal considerations in the preparation of its security assistance budget request. Many needed programs are cut to keep requests within limits dictated by considerations of the total Federal budget. As a result, the request itself is usually only marginally adequate for the needs. In recent years, Congress has tended to cut the overall size of the budget or, too frequently, accomplish the same thing by failing to pass an appropriation. This requires that the program operate under the reduced levels of a CRA, often necessitating supplemental requests to make up for shortfalls. At the same time, there has been a tendency by Congress to earmark large portions of the budget, sometimes at levels in excess of the administration's request, for a few country programs. This necessitates disproportionate cuts in the remaining programs—the programs of most of our security assistance recipients.

Specific program inadequacies include Korea, where because of underfunding off-budget credits in the fiscal year 1983 CRA, we have had to cut assistance 33 percent below the fiscal year 1982 level. The other country programs in the fiscal year 1983 supplemental request were victims of similar cuts. Prominent among these are: Thailand, Jordan, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Tunisia, Yemen, Turkey, Kenya, Somalia, numerous smaller African programs, Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras, and several smaller Latin American programs. Even with a full supplemental appropriation, fiscal year 1983 programs for most of these countries would be less than needed.

Moreover, U.S. security assistance efforts are inadequate to assist many of the poorer nations of the world because of their form. Guaranteed credits are not much real assistance to many countries. They need grant aid. A higher proportion of our security assistance needs to be in the form of MAP grants or concessional loan terms. As a corollary to this, we need to recognize that guaranteed credits are not a giveaway program, but that they benefit the U.S. economy because they are used to buy U.S. products and are subsequently repaid with interest. We should be able to be more generous with our credits for those countries where this is the most appropriate form of assistance.

While our security assistance programs can never be a substitute for strong U.S. armed forces, they do provide a very cost-effective force enhancement complement to U.S. military strength. We should support more rapid military improvements through security assistance that will benefit friendly countries and simultaneously improve our global force posture at relatively little cost to the United States.

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AT RAS BANAS

Chairman TOWER. Recently there have been certain changes concerning the Military Construction project at Ras Banas in Egypt. Would you please explain these changes, particularly as they would affect U.S. access to the Ras Banas facilities?

Mr. ARMITAGE. In mid-May an agreement was reached by representatives of the governments of Egypt and the United States that U.S. control of construction at Ras Banas, which would stem from the U.S. funding, was incompatible with Egyptian political, legal and constitutional requirements. Prolonged intensive study by a joint committee had failed to reconcile fundamental differences affecting construction modalities. To avoid future problems or further inconclusive negotiations, the government of Egypt has elected to have Egypt investigate funding the upgrading of Ras Banas with Egyptian or possibly other Arab funds, while acknowledging that the improvements may be more modest or take longer as a result. The GOE does not rule out U.S. funding for certain improvements, such as desalinization facilities or POL systems. With or without U.S. funding, the GOE has reaffirmed the principle of the Sadat letter of 1981 regarding U.S. use of that facility. The reaffirmation has been delivered verbally and in a recent letter to SECSTATE from the Egyptian Ambassador to the United States. There

is every reason to believe that the United States will continue to enjoy access to Ras Banas under the same conditions as in the past.

JAPANESE SELF-DEFENSE EFFORT

Chairman TOWER. From your perspective, what can the United States do to obtain greater Japanese self-defense effort?

Mr. ARMITAGE. In my view, to obtain a greater Japanese self-defense effort, the U.S. needs to:

(1) Continue to convince the Japanese that we will not pull out of the Pacific; and

(2) Continue to call Japan's attention to its present inability to carry out its share of a defense division of labor which is very favorable to Japan.

Japan realizes it cannot take on the Soviet Union single-handedly. The thought that the United States might abandon the Pacific to fight a war in Europe first, an option the GOJ felt the Carter administration might exercise, was not reassuring. The Reagan administration has told the GOJ we will protect its sea-lanes in the Indian Ocean and in the Southwest Pacific and provide offensive power, including the nuclear umbrella, in the Northwest Pacific. This assurance which has been backed up by operational deployments has gained Japanese confidence.

Despite Prime Minister Suzuki's acceptance of defense burdensharing on behalf of the Japanese Government for the first time in the postwar period in 1981 and Prime Minister Nakasone's forthright and realistic statements on defense, Japan is still not doing what needs to be done, i.e. funding the shortfalls which preclude accomplishment of Japan's agreed defense share: defense of its territory, surrounding sea and air, and sea-lanes to a distance of 1,000 miles. Japan's Ground, Maritime, and Air Forces all lack realistic amounts of ammunition to sustain combat, and therefore to constitute a deterrent. The Ground Force has a great deal of obsolete equipment, and the Maritime and Air Forces need to be increased in size to cover the sea-lanes. Significant budget increases would be necessary to achieve the requisite capability by 1990.

Support of the Congress in convincing the Japanese we will remain in the Pacific in strength and in encouraging Japanese leaders to achieve within this decade the reasonable goals they set for themselves would be very helpful.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN, ANSWERS SUPPLIED BY MR. ARMITAGE

JAPAN'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE COMMON DEFENSE

Senator LEVIN. Japan's new Prime Minister said some very encouraging words about his nation's role in helping the United States defend East Asia against the Soviets when he visited this country. There now is concern, however, as to whether the Prime Minister is backing away from this renewed commitment to increase Japan's contributions to the common defense.

What is your assessment of the present situation?

Mr. ARMITAGE. Prime Minister Nakasone has not backed away from the statements he made when visiting the United States in January. On the contrary, he has continued to speak out in the Diet and at other fora on Japan's need to have a meaningful defense capability. To cite only a few examples, the Prime Minister and his administration have stated in the Diet that Japan could block the three straits of the Sea of Japan prior to Japan's being attacked and that Japan could under some circumstances defend U.S. ships in the Northwest Pacific. Despite opposition party and media criticism over such statements, the Prime Minister has persisted.

JAPAN'S DEFENSE BUDGET

Senator LEVIN. Despite his statements, Japan's defense budget last year grew by only 6.5 percent. The year before, that growth was 7.75 percent. This hardly seems like progress.

When is Prime Minister Nakasone going to put his money where his promises are?

What do you project will be the increase in Japanese defense spending in 1984 by the time they make their final decision in December of this year?

Mr. ARMITAGE. The defense spending increases for 1982 and 1983 were disappointing despite their relatively large size compared to the increases of other Japanese ministries and agencies. The threat situation, however, requires Japan to do more in absolute terms. Prime Minister Nakasone was in office only about one month before the 1983 budget was finalized. Although I cannot predict the budget figure for 1984, I hope that it will be based on the need to accomplish a realistic Japanese defense capability by the end of the decade.

INCREASING DEFENSE CAPABILITIES

Senator LEVIN. Is it not true that Japan could significantly increase its annual defense spending without creating offensive capabilities which would threaten the rest of Asia?

Is it not true that the Japanese have so far to go to increase their self-defense capabilities just to meet their commitment to defend the sea lanes out of 1,000 miles from the home islands that they could spend between 1.5 percent and 2 percent of their GNP annually between now and 1991 and still not threaten other nations with offensive capabilities?

Mr. ARMITAGE. I believe Japan could increase its defense capabilities significantly without creating offensive capabilities threatening the rest of Asia. Japan could achieve the capabilities to defend its territory, air space, and sea-lanes to 1000 miles by procuring the bullets, torpedoes, and missiles to make its present forces sustainable in territorial defense and increase its maritime and air force to the level necessary to provide for an effective sea-lane and air defense. The Department of Defense estimates these capabilities could be achieved by spending less than two percent of GNP for defense and that Japan's Asian friends would support such Japanese efforts.

Senator LEVIN. How can Japan be moving in the right direction to improve its self defense capabilities when its 1983 defense budget represents the following:

Procurement of fewer F–15s for homeland air defense than were in both the 1982 and 1980 Japanese defense budgets, when an even lower percent of a lower GNP was devoted to defense:

Fewer major aircraft procured than in both 1980 and 1982; and

Lowest number of ships to be procured in the last four years?

Mr. ARMITAGE. Japan is moving in the right direction in that its total force levels and overall capabilities are increasing each year. Unfortunately, the size of the threat relative to Japan's growth mean that the pace of increase is insufficient for the effort required.

Senator LEVIN. Is it not true that the 1983 Japanese defense budget delays achievement of the defense improvement objectives set in the now outdated 1976 official defense program outline. Even more must be done now, but Japan is falling even further behind.

How is that progress?

Mr. ARMITAGE. The 1983–1987 Mid Term Defense Plan aims to accomplish the goals of the 1976 National Defense Program Outline which the U.S. judges to be outdated. The 1983 budget puts the Defense Agency behind schedule in achieving the 1976 levels. The 1983 budget does create slightly larger force levels, but the rate of progress is not adequate.

FORCES NEEDED TO DEFEND THE SEALANES

Senator LEVIN. Here is a partial list of forces Japan must acquire to defend the sea lanes out to 1,000 miles.

[The partial list is as follows: what Japan needs to add to achieve capabilities to defend self & sea-lanes of communication out to 1,000 miles (to present forces//to 1976 Program)]

3–4 squadrons w/ABT. 100 more F–15's//same.

6–8 squadrons w/ABT. 200 more F–15's//same.

2 squadrons W/8–10 AWACS Equivalent aircraft and 10–14 KC–10 equivalent tankers//half this capability.

3–4 squadrons w/60–90 jets//same.

3–7 SAM groups w/improved HAWK and Patriot missiles//same.

10–12 subs/8–10 subs.

Abt. 20 frigates/destroyers//10–12 frigates/destroyers.

Abt. 130 high performance P–3C aircraft to replace entire existing force//Abt. 50 P–3C's.

25,000 active + Abt. 30,000 reservists//same.

Thousands of tons of ammo. Thousands of mines, torpedoes, air-to-air missiles.

Does DOD agree that at a minimum these are needed?

What other forces would the Japanese need to accomplish this mission?

Mr. ARMITAGE. The list of forces you provided is illustrative of levels which we believe are realistic, but there is not any one list which is sacrosanct. I have no doubt that Japanese defense officials know precisely what is necessary to achieve an effective defense. They have not been provided with requisite funding to achieve what is necessary.

Senator LEVIN. To develop the capabilities to defend the sea lanes out to 1,000 miles, Japan's stated policy, it will be necessary for them to annually increase their defense spending by between 10 and 12 percent, at least, in real terms annually, will it not?

Mr. ARMITAGE. I would not like to quote a specific figure because what the money is spent for is also very important. I believe Japan would find it necessary to make annual increases greater than those Japan made in the 1970's (average 7.8 percent in real terms) in order to achieve an effective 1000-mile sea-lane capability.

Chairman TOWER. Our next nominee is Gen. Paul X. Kelley.

[The nomination reference, résumé of service career, and biographical sketch of General Kelley follow:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
March 31, 1983.
(Under authority of the order of the Senate of March 24, 1983.)

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

The following named officer, under provisions of Title 10, United States Code, Section 5201, to be Commandant of the Marine Corps:

To be Commandant of the Marine Corps

Gen. Paul X. Kelley, 021–20–2302, United States Marine Corps.

RÉSUMÉ OF SERVICE CAREER OF PAUL X. KELLEY, GENERAL, U.S. MARINE CORPS

Date and place of birth: 11 November 1928, Boston, Massachusetts.

Years of active service: 33.

Military schools attended: The Basic School, Quantico, Va.; Sea School, Portsmouth, Va.; School of Naval Justice, Newport, R.I.; Airborne School, Fort Benning, Ga.; Pathfinder School, Fort Benning, Ga.; Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.

Major permanent duty assignments:

1st Marine Division (Regt CO), June 1970 to May 1971.

Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Plans and Policy Directorate; Executive Assistant to the Director, Joint Staff), June 1971 to August 1974.

4th Marine Division (Commanding General), August 1975 to May 1978.

Marine Corps Development and Education Command (Director, Development and Education Command (Director, Development Center; Director, Education Center), July 1975 to May 1978.

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (DC/S for Requirements and Programs), May 1978 to January 1980.

Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, MacDill AFB, Fla. (Commander), January 1980 to June 1981.

Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps and Chief of Staff), July 1981 to present.

Promotions: Second Lieutenant, June 1950; First Lieutenant, April 1952; Captain, December 1953; Major, March 1961; Lieutenant Colonel, February 1966; Colonel, April 1970; Brigadier General, September 1974; Major General, June 1976; Lieutenant General, February 1980; and General, July 1981.

Medals and awards:

Silver Star.

Legion of Merit with 2 gold stars in lieu of second and third awards with Combat "V".

Bronze Star Medal with gold star in lieu of second award with Combat "V".

Joint Service Commendation Medal.

Navy Commendation Medal.

Army Commendation Medal.

Combat Action Ribbon.

Presidential Unit Citation.

Navy Unit Commendation.

Navy Occupation Service Medal with Europe Clasp.

National Defense Service Medal with bronze star.

Vietnam Service Medal with silver star and bronze star.

Vietnam Army Distinguished Service Order, 2d class.

Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry with palm.

Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry with gold star.

Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry with silver star.

Vietnam Armed Forces Honor Medal, 1st class.

Staff Service Medal, 1st class.

Republic of Vietnam Meritorious Unit Citation Gallantry Cross Color.

Republic of Vietnam Meritorious Unit Citation Civil Actions Color, 1st class.

Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal with device.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GEN. PAUL X. KELLEY, USMC

General Paul X. Kelley is the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps and Chief of Staff, Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, D.C.

General Kelley was born on November 11, 1928, in Boston, Mass. He graduated from Villanova University with a B.S. degree in Economics and was commissioned a Marine second lieutenant in June 1950.

In March 1951, after completing instruction at The Basic School, Quantico, Va., he served consecutively as a platoon leader, assistant battalion operations officer and assistant division training officer with the 2d Marine Division, Camp Lejeune, N.C. He was transferred to the USS *Salem*. Flagship of the 6th Fleet, during September 1952, serving as the Executive Officer and then the Commanding Officer of the Marine Detachment for a period of 20 months. He was promoted to captain on Dec. 16, 1953.

He was ordered to Camp Pendleton, Calif., in July 1954, where he served as a battalion executive officer with the 1st Infantry Training Regiment. Transferred to Japan in February 1955, he served as the Division Training Officer, 3d Marine Division. From August 1955 to June 1956, he served as the Aide-de-Camp to the Deputy Commanding General, and then as Assistant Force Training Officer, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, in Hawaii.

Returning to the U.S. in July 1956, General Kelley became the Special Assistant to the Director of Personnel at Headquarters Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., until December 1957. Following his assignment in Washington, he completed the Airborne Pathfinder School at Ft. Benning, Ga. In February 1958, he was assigned to the newly activated 2d Force Reconnaissance Company, Force Troops, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, Camp Lejeune, where he served as the Executive Officer and then Commanding Officer.

From September 1960 to May 1961, he was the U.S. Marine Corps Exchange Officer with the British Royal Marines. During this tour he attended the Commando Course in England, served as Assistant Operations Officer with 45 Commando in Aden, and as Commander "C" Troop, 42 Commando in Singapore, Malaya and Borneo. On March 1, 1961, he was promoted to major.

He was assigned to Marine Corps Schools, Quantico, in July 1961, and served there as a tactics phase chief at The Basic School; and then Reconnaissance and Surveillance Officer at the Marine Corps Landing Force Development Center.

In June 1964, he assumed duties as Commanding Officer, Marine Barracks, Newport, R.I. He remained at that post until August 1965, when he was trans-

ferred to Vietnam and reported to the 3d Marine Amphibious Force, FMF, Pacific, as the Combat Intelligence Officer. Following this assignment, he served as the Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment in Vietnam. He was promoted to lieutenant colonel on Jan. 20, 1966. During this tour as battalion commander, he earned the Silver Star Medal, the Legion of Merit with Combat "V" and two awards of the Bronze Star Medal with Combat "V".

From Vietnam, he proceeded to the U.S. Army Infantry School at Ft. Benning, where he served from August 1966 to July 1968, as the Senior Marine Corps Representative of the Commandant of the Marine Corps. He then attended the Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., graduating as a "Distinguished Graduate" in May 1969. For his excellence in politico-military strategy while a student at the Air War College, the Board of Trustees of the National Geographic Society elected him a life member.

He returned to Headquarters Marine Corps in June 1969, as the Military Assistant to the Assistant Commandant. He was promoted to colonel on April 1, 1970, and in June 1970 was reassigned to Vietnam where he commanded the 1st Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division. General Kelley redeployed the regiment, the last Marine ground combat unit to leave Vietnam, to Camp Pendleton, Calif., in May 1971. During his second tour in Vietnam, he was awarded a second Legion of Merit with Combat "V".

Reassigned to the Washington area in July 1971, General Kelley served as the Chief, Southeast Asia Branch, Plans and Policy Directorate, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, where he remained until November 1973, when he was assigned as the Executive Assistant to the Director, Joint Staff. Upon completion of this tour he was awarded a third Legion of Merit.

Following his promotion to brigadier general on Aug. 6, 1974, he was assigned as the Commanding General, 4th Marine Division.

In June 1975, General Kelley was ordered to the Marine Corps Development and Education Command, at Quantico, where he assumed the duties as Director, Development Center. He assumed duties as Director, Education Center and was advanced to the grade of major general on June 29, 1976.

In May 1978, General Kelley was ordered to Headquarters Marine Corps, where he became Deputy Chief of Staff for Requirements and Programs.

On Feb. 4, 1980, General Kelley was promoted to lieutenant general and appointed by the President as the first Commander of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, a four service force with headquarters at MacDill AFB, Tampa, Florida.

General Kelley was promoted to the rank of general and assumed duties as Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps and Chief of Staff on July 1, 1981.

General Kelley's personal decorations and awards include: the Silver Star Medal; Legion of Merit with Combat "V" and two gold stars in lieu of second and third awards; the Bronze Star Medal with Combat "V" and a gold star in lieu of a second award; the Joint Service Commendation Medal; Navy Commendation Medal; and the Army Commendation Medal. He is a Marine Corps Parachutist and U.S. Army Master Parachutist.

General Kelley and his wife the former Barbara Adams of Fall River, Mass., have a daughter, Mrs. John Cimko.

Chairman TOWER. General Kelley is a graduate of Villanova University and has served with distinction in the U.S. Marine Corps since 1950. General Kelley is currently the Assistant Commandant and Chief of Staff of the Marine Corps.

Prior to this time, he served as the first commander of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. He also served as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Requirements and Programs of the Marines, and Director of the Development Center and of the Education Center at the Marine Corps Development and Educational Command at Quantico. He has also been the Commanding General of the Fourth Marine Division.

Previously, General Kelley had extensive combat command experience in Vietnam.

General Kelley holds the Silver Star Medal, the Navy Commendation Medal, and the Army Commendation Medal. He is a Marine Corps parachutist and a U.S. Army Master parachutist.

Most Members of the committee have had an opportunity to visit with General Kelley from time to time in the past. I think we are all aware of the outstanding service General Kelley has rendered to his country during his entire career, and I am confident that the Marine Corps will be well served under General Kelley's leadership as its Commandant.

It is my understanding that your wife Barbara is here. Will she stand?

STATEMENT OF GEN. PAUL X. KELLEY

General KELLEY. I am sorry, sir. She was supposed to make it, but must have been delayed in traffic because she has not arrived.

Chairman TOWER. Well, I understand how those things work.

General KELLEY. I will make sure I give her a little leadership counseling this evening. [Laughter.]

Chairman TOWER. Senator Kennedy?

STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD M. KENNEDY, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

It is really a very special privilege and an honor for me to come before you this afternoon to support the nomination of Gen. P. X. Kelley as Commandant of the Marine Corps.

Massachusetts takes great pride in its long tradition of military service to the Nation. We also take great pride in claiming P. X. Kelley as a native son. Our Commonwealth was the home of the American Revolution, and for over 200 years the citizens of Massachusetts have taken seriously their obligation to serve the country. From raw recruits to seasoned general officers, Massachusetts has given freely of its citizens to provide for the national defense.

The Kelley family has also dedicated itself to national service. General Kelley's father served with distinction in the U.S. Army, rising to the rank of major before his death in World War II.

His brother Al, whom I have known for 20 years, spent a distinguished career in the Navy and in NASA as a test pilot and program manager, and he continues to work on defense issues as president of Arthur D. Little Consulting Co.

General Kelley's sister, Mrs. Barbara Mower, serves on the research and analysis staff of the State Department and has spent several tours abroad on diplomatic assignments with her husband.

General Kelley had the extraordinary good fortune to be born not just in Boston, but also of Irish-American parents. For the past 33 years he has proven himself to be a great American, a son of the entire Nation.

General Kelley comes before us well-prepared to assume the position of Commandant. He has had extensive command experience, and several tours of duty which have added breadth and versatility to his preparation.

Early in his career, General Kelley commanded a sea-going Marine unit in the Mediterranean; later on, as an exchange officer, he com-

manded a British commando unit in the Far East. He has headed the Marine Corps Development Center, contributing vitally to the future of the Corps in that position.

In Vietnam he served two tours of duty, first as Commander of Second Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment, and later as Commander of the First Marine Regiment.

General Kelley's 33 years of military service have also provided an ideal background for someone who will serve not only as Marine Corps Commandant, but also as one of the President's chief military advisers.

It is not surprising that General Kelley has served with the Navy throughout his career, but it is worth noting that he has also served with the Army Infantry at Fort Benning, Ga., and is a distinguished graduate of the Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.

In 1980 General Kelley was appointed by President Carter to be the First Commander of the Rapid Deployment Force. While this may not have been the General's most satisfying assignment, it was certainly one of his most challenging. Given little more than a tablet of paper and a sharp pencil, P. X. Kelley created the U.S. Central Command, our military force for dealing with one of the world's most sensitive regions, Southwest Asia.

Few members of the Joint Chiefs have ever assumed office with such impressive background and extensive familiarity with the other military services.

This is indeed an exceptional man—a man of extraordinary capabilities, a combat veteran, a military strategist, a true leader in every sense of the word.

I have not always agreed with President Reagan, but in the matter of nominating a new Commandant of the Marine Corps, the President has made an outstanding choice.

P. X. Kelley is a credit to his home State of Massachusetts, to Irish-Americans everywhere, to the Marine Corps, and most importantly, to the Nation which he has served so proudly and so well.

I take pleasure in commending him to the Senate, and I urge his confirmation as the next Commandant of the Marine Corps.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you, Senator.

General Kelley, will you appear before this committee or any other appropriate committee of Congress when you are asked to give testimony on matters affecting your area of responsibility?

General KELLEY. It would be my honor to do that, Senator Tower.

Chairman TOWER. Furthermore, when asked, will you give us your judgment on any questions as a professional military man regardless of what the administration policy might be?

General KELLEY. Sir, you have my solemn promise on that. As in the past, in the future you will always get a straightforward answer.

Chairman TOWER. Knowing you the way I do, I would say that I have no doubt that that is the case.

Senator Kennedy, do you have any questions?

Senator KENNEDY. General Kelley, I was interested in your views on the cost of living for military members. I don't know whether you want to get started off on that one, but it might be interesting to know your views.

If there is a Government-wide military-civilian cost-of-living increase in 1984, should the military increase be targeted or across the board?

General KELLEY. I think, Senator, since this is prior to confirmation, of course I unequivocably support the President's program. However, with that said, if it was the will of the Congress to grant a pay raise to the military, then, personally, I would support an across-the-board pay raise at the 4-percent level.

Senator KENNEDY. The Marine Corps has asked for 2,700 more men and women in the 1984 budget.

Do you want to tell us what those 2,700 troops will be used for?

General KELLEY. I think it is significant to note, Senator, that for the last 2 years in our program we have frozen our end strength. We are attempting primarily to build up our combat service support capability which is so essential to the long-term logistics support and sustainability of our corps.

As you probably know, we have taken on increased missions because of our maritime pre-positioning ship concept which is now coming into reality in 1984, 1985, and 1986. These 2,700 new Marines will be primarily oriented toward supporting our logistics and sustainability efforts in this regard.

Senator KENNEDY. An area that I referred to in my opening comments was your responsibility as commander of the Rapid Deployment Force. Some people have said that the RDF is really not needed because we already have one and that is the U.S. Marines—that is the mission of the Marines.

Do we need a Rapid Deployment Force or could the Marines do the job better?

General KELLEY. I think, Senator, you have to look at the totality. As of now, we don't have an organization known as Rapid Deployment Task Force. We currently have a new unified command for the Middle East. I wholeheartedly endorsed and do endorse the creation of that command.

I think it focuses the U.S. attention on an area that is extremely vital to our national interest. I think we probably chose a poor term calling this a Rapid Deployment Force because, as Secretary Schlesinger in an article very correctly pointed out, that conjures up the questions of how rapid, what can deploy and what kind of force is it?

But the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force that I was privileged to command for 1½ years consisted of all of the Marines which could be deployed; in other words, all the Marines for whom there was available amphibious ships.

Also included in addition to that, 2⅓ Army divisions, 4 Air Force tactical fighting wings, 3 carrier battle groups, and 35 B–52H bomber wings.

In answering your question, I would have to say the deployable Marine Corps was a mere part of the total force of some 250,000 which I commanded.

Senator KENNEDY. You think that that mix is a superior force or has superior capability than just the Marines themselves?

General KELLEY. Yes, sir, for the mission that was given to the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, which was countering the Soviet threat in the Middle East.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Thurmond?

Senator THURMOND. General, have you ever served at Parris Island?

General KELLEY. Sir, I have not had that privilege. Unfortunately now I am at a stage in my career where I probably never will.

Senator THURMOND. Since you were not born in the South and have not served at Parris Island, don't you feel a little handicapped?

General KELLEY. Do I have to answer that question, Senator? [Laughter.]

Senator THURMOND. On account of your outstanding service and your dedication and ability, I will be glad to support you anyway.

General KELLEY. I did serve two tours in upper South Carolina at Camp Lejeune.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Wilson?

Senator WILSON. Mr. Chairman, I have no questions of General Kelley.

I will simply state for you and my colleagues on this committee that I am always interested in peer evaluation. I happen to have the privilege to enjoy the friendship and be the beneficiary of a great deal of advice, some solicited and some simply volunteered, from my former colleagues, some of whom are now on active duty, but mostly retired in my home community of San Diego.

They confirm the commendation that he has received from these gentlemen who think he is an outstanding marine, outstanding commander and outstanding tactical and strategic thinker. They welcomed the President's action in nominating him to be the Commandant. I am pleased to be on this committee and have an opportunity to vote for his confirmation.

Chairman TOWER. Are there any further questions?

I have a few questions I would like to submit to you for response in writing for the record.

General KELLEY. Certainly.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Warner has just come in.

Senator Warner, would you like to ask P. X. any questions?

Senator WILSON. Before Senator Warner takes his seat, I would like to say something else in regard to General Kelley. I do not wish to offend my dear friend, the senior Senator from South Carolina, but I share something else with General Kelley. That is I narrowly avoided service at Parris Island. It was my next duty station at the time that I left the Marine Corps.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Warner, do you have any questions?

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have had the privilege of working with this distinguished American for many years now. He is the first of the new breed in a way. General Barrow will be the last World War II combat officer who has been Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps.

While that indeed is a heritage we shall miss, I am certain that you will equal his professional ability in the guidance of the corps. I wish you well.

General KELLEY. If I may say, Senator, that Robert Barrow is a Marine's marine who has had my boundless respect for so many years, that if I could only emulate this man's courage, his dignity, his honesty

and integrity, if I could emulate this for the next 4 years, I do believe I can be a very successful Commandant.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOWER. Anything else?

P. X., I think everybody knows you so well around here they can't think of anything to ask you right now. We are all more than pleased with your appointment. I think we all feel you will do a splendid job.

Congratulations on your nomination. We will probably act on it this afternoon with alacrity. I don't know of any major opposition. There are not even any demonstrators outside the door.

I see another colleague has walked in.

Senator NUNN. Did you say anything about major opposition?

General KELLEY. You mentioned major opposition and the door opened.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Nunn, do you have any questions?

Senator NUNN. General Kelley is the greatest general I know. I am delighted to support him. I am proud he is going to be there.

General KELLEY. Thank you, sir.

Chairman TOWER. I think we will let you go before anybody else wanders in the door.

General KELLEY. Thank you very much.

[Questions with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY CHAIRMAN JOHN TOWER, ANSWERS SUPPLIED BY GEN. PAUL X. KELLEY

U.S. DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT

Chairman TOWER. As a senior military leader in the U. S. defense establishment, what concerns do you have about either the pace or direction of the U.S. defense effort?

General KELLEY. Today, the U.S. defense establishment is more capable and ready than at any time in our recent history. The Marine Corps itself is sound and thriving. Without the confidence and support of the Nation and the Congress of the United States, this achievement would not have been possible. The pace of change has been intense; but such intensity was necessary to halt an extended period of eroding defense capability. I support a long term goal of orderly, consistent investment in defense programs. The current DOD budget provides for this goal; the pace is right.

The realities of this Nation's economic system, coupled with our geopolitical position in the world, create the need for maritime strength second to none—a strength founded in the commercial and industrial might of our free society, mandated by national defense policy, supported by the people and guided by the Congress. To maintain free access to and through the world's waterways, to protect our access to allies and natural resources, we must be able to exercise the full range of capabilities inherent in seapower. Challenges to our vital national interests, as exemplified by the growth of the Soviet Navy, require strong maritime responses. Only credible American seapower can meet these challenges and deter mischief or aggression. Thus, strong naval forces, building to a goal of clear maritime superiority, represent a cornerstone of our national defense policy. The direction is right, too!

NATIONAL STRATEGY

Chairman TOWER. What deficiencies do you see in U. S. national strategy or in the strategic planning process?

General KELLEY. My main concern is the recurring force/strategy mismatch. Substantial improvements in force capabilities are programed in the DOD budget over the next five years; however, [deleted]. If military capabilities are to ever meet the requirements of national strategy, sufficient resources must be allocated to enhance the combat effectiveness of programed forces and per-

mit needed force expansion. Sustainability initiatives should receive special emphasis. [Deleted.] There is substantial risk inherent in current and programed force capabilities that must be recognized, and reduced through an orderly and consistent investment in the defense program.

AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE

Chairman TOWER. For much of the decade of the 1970's, critics claimed that amphibious assaults could not be successfully conducted in today's threat environment. How would you respond to such criticisms?

General KELLEY. Future threats to U.S. interests may well demand the capability to either seize a port or to "create" one: only amphibious forces are inherently capable and equipped to do either. Amphibious forces provide for the precise application of force necessary to support political aims. These ready, flexible, and mobile policy instruments are prepared to respond on order of the National Command Authorities.

In today's world of satellite surveillance and a plethora of other detection/location technologies—particularly as related to amphibious operations—I acknowledge that strategic surprise is likely a thing of the past.

However, tactical surprise will be very much a reality with the introduction of adequate numbers of the Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) in the later part of this decade. This revolutionary high speed craft, when matched with helicopters, will provide the capability to launch an amphibious assault from over the horizon from distances to 50 miles off shore.

The helicopter/LCAC marriage provides a quantum advance in amphibious capability by reducing our vulnerability and dramatically increasing speed and flexibility in the assault.

In short, we will soon have the ability to selectively spearhead an assault in an area that can be best used to our advantage, rather than be limited to a relative handful of conventional easily identifiable landing sites.

Chairman TOWER. Amphibious warfare has received increased emphasis in the last 2–3 years. What are the greatest deficiencies in amphibious warfare capabilities that remain?

General KELLEY. The Department of the Navy is committed to achieving the capability of lifting the assault echelons of a MAF and a MAB by FY1994 as a mid-term objective. I believe our shipbuilding program tracks toward that objective. However, I see two areas of primary deficiency in our amphibious warfare capability. The first is naval gunfire support. The second area is medium and heavy lift helicopter support.

Over the past decade, surface combatant retirements have resulted in the reduction of available naval guns. (From about 430 tubes in 1973 to the present total of about 260 guns.)

Fire support is delivered by three systems: air, artillery and naval surface fire support. Though all three elements of fire support triad are necessary and complementary, only naval surface fire support is constantly available day and night in all weather before artillery is established ashore. Each leg of the fire support Triad is important. However, the most neglected leg, and badly needed now, is naval surface fire support.

Currently, our naval guns are deficient in size and number and are considered inadequate for all but selected scenarios. Our current naval gunfire capability rests solely on five-inch guns with conventional ammunition. This capability is adequate for soft targets but these weapons possess limited range and lethality. With the planned reactivation of all four *Iowa* class battleships, each equipped with nine 16''-guns, the capability of the Navy to provide naval gunfire support would increase dramatically.

Our declining inventory of medium lift assault helicopters is of great concern to me. Due to the effects of inadequate performance and peacetime attrition, the aging CH–46 and CH–53A/D force lacks adequate capabilities to meet our assault lift requirements. JVX meets the need for a 250 knot assault transport that is self-deployable worldwide, reducing some of the demand for strategic air and sea lift. The urgent need for JVX stems from the requirement for modern replacements for the current force as well as to avert the critical lift shortfall that would occur if JVX were not introduced in 1991.

Capable of lifting 24 Marines up to 200 nautical miles, JVX will provide increased stand-off for naval and landing forces, the ability to rapidly penetrate deep into enemy rear areas or to bypass adverse terrain, weather or threats.

Presently we have two squadrons of CH–53E helicopters operational. This aircraft can lift 32,000 pounds, more than any other helicopter in the free world. The FY84 procurement profile supports the immediate goal of three squadrons which, in conjunction with the five squadrons operating the CH–53A/D, will minimally meet the current heavy lift requirements. However, the ongoing introduction of the M198 howitzer and subsequent fielding of the Light Armored Vehicle (LAV), in addition to normal replacement of aging CH–53A/D's, will require additional CH–53E's.

AMPHIBIOUS LIFT

Chairman TOWER. What is the Department of Defense's current objective for amphibious lift? When can this objective be achieved and what programs must be undertaken to do so? Should this amphibious lift objective be altered?

General KELLEY. Relative to amphibious shipping, the Department of Defense mid-term objective is to provide sufficient ships to simultaneously lift the assault echelons (AE) of a Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) and a Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB). This represents a change from our previous goal of adequate lift for a full MAB in addition to a MAF(AE).

Although this lift requirement exceeds current amphibious ships' capacities, we plan on a progressive increase in capability as the amphibious force levels improve concurrent with attainment of the 600 ship Navy in the 1990's.

This change is indicative of our continuing efforts to achieve realistic lift objectives within the programed and planned amphibious ship capabilities. To accomplish this we have scaled down the overall lift requirement by shifting a portion of the MAB's combat service support elements--Marines, vehicles, and supplies—to an assault follow-on echelon (AFOE), which will be carried by commercial ships.

AMPHIBIOUS SHIP PROGRAMS

Chairman TOWER. From the Marine Corps perspective, what priorities would you establish between the various future amphibious ship programs?

General KELLEY. Amphibious shipbuilding programs are on track and directed toward revitalizing our amphibious capability. This represents an opportunity to truly modernize a large portion of the amphibious force. The first two ships of the LSD–41 Class are on the building ways. The Navy currently plans to build at least 10 LSD–41's. The LHD–1 Class—essentially an LHA altered to allow transport, launch, and recovery of both helicopters and fixed wing aircraft—is in the contract design stage. The Navy is requesting funds in the fiscal year (FY) 1984 budget to build the first LHD. Both the LSD–41 and LHD–1 Class ships will have the capability to carry the LCAC.

Finally, and although still in the conceptual stage, the Navy is taking a hard look at increasing the cargo carrying capacity of future amphibious and support ships. Concepts ranging from an LSD–41 vibrant to a follow-on LPD type ship are being studied.

The Navy's shipbuilding plan has been matched to future amphibious lift requirements resulting in a balanced program that will meet Defense Guidance and insure a credible amphibious warfare capability for the 1990's.

MARINE CORPS MISSIONS

Chairman TOWER. What missions are assigned to the Marine Corps in our planning scenarios? Should these mission assignments be altered? What priorities would you establish among these missions?

General KELLEY. The Marine Corps has historically been assigned three general mission areas: In support of a naval campaign, Marine forces are to be prepared to seize and defend advanced bases; participate in SLOC defense; provide extension of naval control over sea areas of operation; reinforce our Allies through power projection along the world's littorals; and seize/control strategic oceanic choke-points. In support of a land campaign, Marine forces are to be prepared to seize/establish lodgements for the introduction of follow-on forces. As the Nation's force in readiness, Marines are to be available for immediate peacekeeping/political reinforcement missions.

Specific missions assigned to Marine Corps forces in planning scenarios emanate from these general capabilities. In NATO, Marine Corps forces support the naval campaigns to defend the SLOCs, attack/destroy enemy naval forces,

reinforce the NATO allies and provide power projection forces for potential offensive operations against the flanks.

In SWA, Marine Corps forces provide power projection along the Persian Gulf littoral, establish U.S. presence in the region, and support the naval campaign to control access to the Persian Gulf.

In the Pacific region, Marine Corps forces reinforce the Korean peninsula, assist in the defense of the SLOCs to our allies and provide power projection forces in support of offensive operations to exploit Soviet vulnerabilities.

In the Caribbean Basin and South America, Marine Corps forces assist in the naval campaign to defend the SLOCs, threaten the movement of enemy forces and defend our southern approaches.

These assignments reflect the roles and missions allotted to the Marine Corps by law, the strategy and established regional priorities, and the national intelligence estimate of the threat. Should there be changes in any of these determinant factors, a change in Marine Corps mission assignments could well follow. However, I am satisfied with current Marine Corps missions and would not alter nor reprioritize them.

MARINE CORPS REQUIREMENTS

Chairman TOWER. How will the Marine Corps change in the near term? What will your manpower requirements be? How will your weapons systems and defense equipment needs change?

General KELLEY. Planned changes to the Marine Corps during the near term will be evolutionary in nature and will primarily consist of tailoring the service relative to the increased availability of amphibious shipping as a part of the 600 ship Navy projected for the 1990s, the mandated response times of strategic forces, and the increased enemy capabilities.

The changes will progressively match the amphibious assault forces with the capacities and capabilities of amphibious ships. The goal in the 1990s is the simultaneous projection of the assault echelon (AE) of both a Marine amphibious force (MAF) and Marine amphibious brigade (MAB). Included within the projection of strategic forces is the maritime prepositioned ships (MPS) program. MPS will provide forward deployed floating depots of equipment and supplies to support three brigade-size Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTF). The dynamics of simultaneous deployment/employment of a MAF (AE) and MAB (AE) coupled with refining the MPS concept in light of response times and enemy capabilities necessitates changes in our organization, training and equipment.

The most significant change in organization will involve the "stand up" of permanent MAGTF headquarters to meet mandated response times of MAGTF forces deployed/employed in the national interest. The primary role of these permanent MAGTF headquarters will be that of planning the accomplishment of assigned missions. When forces are assigned to the MAGTF, the headquarters will exercise command, control, and administration of the force.

Changes in training will relate to organization, response time, and to the enemy capabilities. Programed state-of-the-art equipment provides a more mobile and lethal force in the near term. Though these forces possess greater mobility and firepower, the size of the ground combat element of the assault echelon of the MAGTF will be smaller in terms of manpower when compared to its contemporary counterpart.

The manpower requirements for the near term will reflect a moderate increase in end strength between FY 83 and FY 88 (194,600 to 203,000 respectively). Quality personnel in sufficient numbers, will remain the key to maintaining the readiness and combat capabilities of Marine operating forces. Re-enlistment of proven, quality Marines will becomes increasingly important with the introduction of new weapons technology.

Turning to the last question, our weapons systems and defense equipment needs are tools that allow the exploitation of enemy vulnerabilities within the constraint of affordable and state-of-the-art technologies. As changes to the enemy's capabilities become known modern technology must provide systems and equipment that can be economically produced by industry to counter these advances. Similarly, as increases or changes occur in the available technologies, the Marine Corps will be looking to put developing possibilities to good advantage. Such modernization will always be balanced against the concomitant requirements of manpower, readiness, and sustainability. In this regard we will

continue our philosophy of equipping the man—not manning the equipment. Modernization efforts will improve our capability for success on a battlefield by furthering our proven concepts, not revolutionizing them. Weapons system changes will be measured, structured, balanced, affordable and durable.

MARINE CORPS PROGRAMS

Chairman TOWER. What changes in emphasis on Marine programs would you recommend? Do you believe that the Marine Corps is too dependent on tactical air for its firepower?

General KELLEY. In answer to the first question, I do not presently recommend any changes in emphasis on Marine programs. The controlling theme of both Marine Corps doctrine and development is to build flexibility into basic capabilities so that change in a threat or a requirement can be subsumed within our force structure, organizational concepts, and weapons system capabilities without major disruption to our force in readiness.

Certainly as technology progresses, evolutionary changes will be made. But some very key concepts will probably not change in the foreseeable future precisely because they have withstood the test of rapidly changing technology and threat and have been found to be enduring. I refer to our emphasis on training and equipping the individual Marine, our emphasis on flexible expeditionary, tailored air-ground task forces, our emphasis on readiness, and our emphasis on sustainability.

Viewing Marine Corps programs as a composite whole, the current total program provides a balanced, affordable, modernized, and a result, a significant force in readiness for contingencies literally world-wide.

In answer to the second question, I do not believe that the Marine Corps is too dependent on tactical air for its firepower. You are aware of our capability and inherent flexibility to task organize in response to a wide variety of situations. In order to project and sustain a credible force—whether the purpose is mere presence, preemptive deterrence, or forcible entry—Marine air-ground task forces in conjunction with naval forces can bring naval gunfire, artillery, armored, and small-unit firepower to bear as well as tactical air power in accomplishing their primary missions. I reemphasize at this point that the force is task organized, or "tailored" to the precise requirement. If all functions of air support and firepower are not required, they are not sent with the force. When challenged, all elements of the force's firepower are capable of and trained to respond to concert therein achieving a far greater multiple in terms of total force than if committed individually.

JCS REORGANIZATION

Chairman TOWER. There has been considerable discussion of the need for changes in the structure and operating procedures of the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. What changes, if any would you recommend?

General KELLEY. I have had the opportunity to review most of the proposals that have been offered to restructure or reform the Joint Chiefs of Staff system. For the most part, I see very little in these proposals which would improve the effectiveness of the JCS. I believe that the system under which we currently operate is sound and effective. I believe that there probably are management and operating procedures which can be enhanced. I know that the JCS have been looking very hard at ways in which to more fully execute their statutory responsibilities—ways to provide more complete and timely advice to the Secretary of Defense and the President. However, I would not presume to offer, at this time, specific recommendations for change to a system in which I have not yet been a principal player or had the opportunity to experience the scope of its effectiveness. As a prospective member of the JCS, I expect to continuously evaluate the functioning and effectiveness of the system and assist in making improvements where possible.

U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

Chairman TOWER. Given your past experience as Commander of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, is the evolution of U.S. capabilities to help defend the Southwest Asia region, including the establishment of the U.S. Central Command, proceeding on the right track?

General KELLEY. The evolution of U.S. capabilities to help defend the Southwest Asia region is proceeding on the right track. The new unified command, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), which was formerly the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, will better serve U.S. interest and the security concerns of friendly regional states and demonstrate U.S. resolve to come to the defense of our friends in the region. U.S. Central Command Headquarters will plan for military operations and conduct exercises in Southwest Asia. No new forces have been assigned, but the command and control structure has been improved significantly. With geographical responsibility for the region from Egypt to Pakistan, Iran to the Horn of Africa, the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, USCENTCOM forces from all four Services will continue to support the goals of regional security and stability. The major focus of USCENTCOM activities will continue to be to provide a security framework which will deter Soviet and Soviet-inspired aggression in the region. While there are logistical problems, ongoing budget initiatives should resolve the majority of these. Moreover, resolution of these logistical problems will significantly enhance our overall global capability.

U.S. MARINES IN LEBANON

Chairman TOWER. What concerns do you have about the continued deployment of U.S. Marines in Lebanon?

General KELLEY. At the request of the Lebanese government, the Multi-National Force established a presence in Beirut last year. The United States commitment to the MNF was, and remains, the Mediterranean Marine Amphibious Unit, supported by the 6th Fleet. Without question, the MNF has been a stabilizing influence for the Lebanese government. Regarding the continued deployment of Marines in Lebanon, I have two concerns.

The first concern is related to the safety of our men as a presence force in an environment with so much potential for terrorist acts. Although I have complete confidence in our Marines' ability to defend themselves, the Embassy bombing in April has increased our awarenes of the many ways a terrorist can choose to act while waging unconventional war.

The second concern is the uncertainty regarding the duration of this commitment and its impact on the planning for exercises in the Mediterranean. Thirteen exercises have been canceled so far. Undoubtedly there are more that will have to be conducted without the 6th Fleet amphibious forces. The additional cost and increases in deployment time mitigate against the commitment of other units. This occurs at a time when a U.S. Naval presence in these exercises might have a very favorable impact on our allies.

LANDING CRAFT AIR CUSHION

Chairman TOWER. There has been a recent dispute between the U.S. General Accounting Office and the Department of the Navy on the competition for the Landing Craft Air Cushion. Would you provide your views of this dispute?

General KELLEY. Although the Marine Corps will be the prime user of LCAC, the Navy rightfully has control of craft procurement. To be sure, LCAC was designed to meet certain Marine Corps requirements—such as the capability to lift our 60 ton battle tank. We have not participated in the source selection phase of LCAC procurement. I think it fair to say that the Navy, Marine Corps and GAO are vitally interested in getting the craft that best fits our needs.

LIGHT ARMORED VEHICLE PROGRAM

Chairman TOWER. As you know, the House Committee on Armed Services deleted the Army funding and substantially reduced the Marine Corps funding for the Light Armored Vehicle program. How important is the Light Armored Vehicle program to the Marine Corps? What would be the results of the House reductions on the program?

General KELLEY. In order to be successful against the continually increasing mobility and firepower of the threat forces the need for weapons systems which provide fire support as well as tactical mobility to the maneuver elements has been identified. To fulfill this need the Marine Corps, in conjunction with the Army, is in the process of fielding a family of Light Armored Vehicles (LAV). The introduction of these vehicles will increase our combat capability through improved ground tactical mobility and increased firepower. This added capability will provide greater freedom of action in amphibious operations as well as offen-

sive and defensive operations ashore. As originally stated in the Marine Corps' Mission Element Need Statement (MENS) for the LAV program ". . . the LAV ranks number one in the Land Warfare (mission) area and number three, behind increased amphibious lift and assault amphibians, in the Amphibious Warfare (mission) area."

The HASC reduction on the program have the potential for killing the entire LAV effort. The elimination of the Army from this joint program would cause the cancellation of the existing multiyear production contract. With a cancellation before the call-up of the third year's production, the Government would be liable for $31.4 million. Of equal concern to the Marine Corps is the impact of the HASC mark on the specific funding for the Marine Corps in fiscal year 1984. By eliminating all but two of the LAV configurations from our acquisition effort our current organizational and operational concept for the LAV will be severely jeopardized if not totally negated.

Chairman TOWER. The committee will now consider the nomination of Chapman B. Cox to be Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower and Reserve Affairs). We are pleased to have Mr. Cox with us today.

Mr. Cox, the committee welcomes you and congratulates you on your nomination. Mr. Cox is presently the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Logistics). He is a magna cum laude, Phi Bet Kappa graduate of the University of Southern California. He earned a law degree at Harvard Law School from which he graduated in 1965.

[The nomination reference and biographical sketch of Mr. Cox follow:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
April 12, 1983.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

Chapman Beecher Cox, of Virginia, to be an Assistant Secretary of the Navy, vice John S. Herrington, resigned.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF CHAPMAN B. COX

Mr. Cox took the oath of office as Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Logistics) on June 25, 1981. To accept his appointment, he resigned as managing partner of Sherman & Howard, a large interstate law firm located in Denver, Colorado.

Mr. Cox received his Bachelor of Arts, magna cum laude, in 1962 from the University of Southern California where he was Executive Officer of the NROTC Battalion and a member of Phi Beta Kappa. He received his Juris Doctor from Harvard Law School in 1965.

Following law school, Mr. Cox served for three years with the United States Marine Corps. After state-side tours at Marine Corps Schools (Virginia), Naval Justice School (Rhode Island) and Camp Pendleton (California), he was assigned in 1967 as Staff Judge Advocate to Commanding General, Ninth Marine Amphibious Brigade, Southeast Asia. His decorations include the Navy Achievement Medal and various unit citations and campaign medals related to his Vietnam service. After release from active duty in 1968, Mr. Cox maintained his participation in the Marine Corps Reserve in which he currently holds the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.

Mr. Cox practiced law from 1968 to 1972 with Adams, Duque & Hazeltine (Los Angeles) and from 1972 to 1981 with Sherman & Howard (Denver). He is a member of the Bar of the Supreme Courts of the States of California and Colorado and of the Court of Military Appeals. He served as a Section Chairman and as a member of the Board of Governors of the Colorado Bar Association. In addition to publishing articles in professional journals, he has conducted several continuing legal education courses and was a visiting lecturer at the University of Colorado Law School.

Apart from his legal practice, Mr. Cox has engaged in legislative affairs at the state level and in political organizations and campaigns at both the state

and national level. After the signing of the Camp David Accord in 1979, he performed a good will mission to Syria and Jordan in a six-member delegation sponsored by the U.S. State Department.

Mr. Cox was born on July 31, 1940; is married to Jeannette Korody of Anchorage, Alaska; and has two sons. He is a ruling elder of the United Presbyterian Church. His leisure time activities include skiing, tennis, basketball and backpacking.

Chairman TOWER. We have a member of our committee, Senator Warner, to present Mr. Chapman to the committee.

Senator Warner?

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN W. WARNER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF VIRGINIA

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I will pick up where you left off.

Following law school, Mr. Cox served for 3 years with the U.S. Marine Corps, including duty in South Vietnam. He is currently a lieutenant colonel in the Marine Corps Reserve. He has first-hand experience of the special pressures that our military personnel face, as well as the sacrifices they are called upon to make in peace and wartime.

Mr. Cox is an experienced attorney, having practiced law in California and in Colorado for 13 years before joining the Government in 1981. Since June 1981, Mr. Cox has been serving as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Logistics.

Mr. Chairman, I am sure I am joined by other Members of the committee in looking forward to working closely with this distinguished American. He is eminently qualified for this position and I urge my colleagues to give him the needed support to get on with the job.

Having said that, we should introduce his lovely wife, Jeannette.

Chairman TOWER. We are delighted to have you here and your children.

My good man, you are on your own.

STATEMENT OF CHAPMAN B. COX

Mr. Cox. Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of Chapman B. Cox follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAPMAN B. COX

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your indulgence in allowing me to make a brief statement for the record before answering the committee's questions.

First, I want to thank Senator Warner for his kind remarks in presenting me to the committee. I know that the committee members, as well as many others of his fellow Americans, hold him in highest regard. Therefore I am especially grateful for his support and deeply honored by his expression of confidence.

What I would like to communicate to you about myself is rather basic. I appear before you today as a very fortunate and grateful citizen. Very few of my fellow citizens are so fortunate to receive this great an opportunity to serve our country. I am very grateful for the honor of being nominated by the President. I am humbled by the trust which he and the Secretary have shown in me and sobered by the responsibility of this position.

Nevertheless, I am enthusiastic to meet its challenges and I pledge to you, as I have to them, my total dedication to an effective administration of the manpower and reserve affairs of the Navy and Marine Corps.

Thank you.

Chairman TOWER. Mr. Cox, will you agree to appear before this committee or any other appropriate committee of the Congress when summoned to do so to testify on any matter in your area of responsibility?

Mr. Cox. Yes, sir.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Nunn, do you have any questions?

Senator NUNN. No, I have no questions.

This manpower area is a very important area and he is assuming important responsibilities. With his background I look forward to working with him.

Mr. Cox. I appreciate that.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Thurmond?

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Chairman, I don't think I have any questions.

Mr. Cox has a fine record, I am sure he will do a splendid job over there. If I did not know him very well, but anyone who can win the hand of such a pretty woman and has two fine sons, I would vote for anyway.

Mr. Cox. Thank you, sir.

Senator WARNER. That is the voice of experience. [Laughter.]

Chairman TOWER. Senator Warner?

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I am quite satisfied and think it is a privilege to have such an understanding man as Mr. Cox prepared to take on additional governmental responsibilities.

His family will have to make a number of personal sacrifices to make that possible. He has my support.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Wilson?

Senator WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would not only echo what Senator Warner has said, but I think we are especially fortunate in Mr. Cox's service. He has already demonstrated to be extraordinarily able.

Having worked in the legislative setting and considering the importance of the kind of liaison between his department and this body, I think that his abilities are particularly well suited to enhance communication.

I think we will be able to rely on the communications that will be received from him in this capacity and I personally will take great comfort in his being there.

Mr. Cox. Thank you, sir.

Chairman TOWER. Mr. Cox, I have some questions for you I would like to submit for you to respond to in writing in a timely fashion for the record.

Mr. Cox. I will be happy to.

Chairman TOWER. Are there any other questions of Mr. Cox?

Mr. Cox, thank you very much for being with us today. We congratulate you on your appointment and look forward to working with you.

Mr. Cox. Thank you very much, sir.

[Questions with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY CHAIRMAN TOWER, ANSWERS SUPPLIED BY CHAPMAN B. COX

RESERVE AND GUARD COMPONENTS

Chairman TOWER. This year the Congress has renewed its efforts to strengthen the contribution of our Reserve and Guard Components to our national defense.

If the active-duty Navy end strength is not allowed to grow as much as planned, what additional responsibilities would be assumed by the Naval Reserve?

Mr. COX. Due to the fact that our forces are forward deployed in peacetime, world-wide, it is difficult to substitute Reservists during peacetime in roles currently performed by active duty personnel without degrading mission capability, readiness and opportunities for balanced sea-shore rotation. In addition, a man year of effort from a Reservist in peacetime is generally more expensive and less productive than a man year for an active duty member due to the increased training and transportation costs and the discontinuity of effort associated with rotating Reservists to active duty in support of a full time mission. Nevertheless, we will work with the Navy, Marine Corps and this committee to find ways for increasing the use of Reservists to achieve our planned force growth with minimal degradation of readiness and additional cost.

PAY RAISE FOR MILITARY

Chairman TOWER. Congress is likely to approve a half-year pay raise for military personnel.

Assuming that a military pay raise is enacted into law, should Congress concentrate its limited dollars on the middle and senior enlisted grades and officer ranks?

Mr. COX. I believe that the pay freeze for fiscal year 1984 would help speed the economic recovery now underway. This pay freeze can be imposed without long term adverse effects on recruiting and retention if military pay rates are adjusted in fiscal year 1985 to assure comparability to the civilian sector. However, if Congress allocates funds to a pay raise in fiscal year 1984, the Navy would prefer to concentrate such raise on the middle and senior enlisted grades and officer ranks. The Marine Corps would prefer to spread any such raise evenly across the board.

Chairman TOWER. The Navy and Marine Corps have been enjoying unprecedented success in recruiting and retaining highly qualified personnel.

How can Congress support the Services in insuring that this remarkable record continues as the economy improves and the pool of eligible young people shrinks?

Mr. COX. The Services' success in recruiting and retention has been the result of past congressional support for pay comparability, professional recruiting, and effective advertising. General economic conditions have also been a factor. As the economy improves, it is essential that Congress adjust military pay rates in fiscal year 1985 and thereafter to achieve comparability. Meanwhile, congressional support for Enlistment, Selective Reenlistment, and Officer Bonus programs is also critical in attaining the right mix of skills in both officer and enlisted ranks. We must also strive to insure that current benefit and quality of life programs are not allowed to deteriorate. Full authorization and funding of our recruiting program is equally essential if we are to continue to attain our recruiting goals in the face of a declining pool of eligible youth and an improving economy.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN, ANSWER SUPPLIED BY CHAPMAN B. COX

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Cox, you will remain as co-trustee of a trust which currently holds stock in several companies which are on the DOD Prime Contractors (over $10,000) list. I understand that the trust instrument specifically reserves the power and responsibility for investment decisions to your co-trustee, who also is the settlor of the trust. In addition, you have agreed not to give any advice to the trust regarding investment by the trust in any company or entity which has any business relationship with the Department of Defense. Mr. Cox, in doing so, have you also agreed not to pass on to your co-trustee or the beneficiaries of this trust any factual information you might receive about these companies—

such as information about their present or prospective financial health—while you occupy this position?

Mr. Cox. Yes.

Chairman TOWER. Taken in the order that they were presented to the committee, the Chair is prepared to entertain a motion that the nominees be favorably reported beginning with Mr. Armitage.

Senator WILSON. I so move.

Senator THURMOND. I second the motion.

Chairman TOWER. Is there any objection?

Without objection, Mr. Armitage will be favorably reported.

The Chair is prepared to entertain a similar motion with respect to General Kelley.

Senator THURMOND. I so move.

Chairman TOWER. Is there objection?

Without objection, General Kelley will be reported.

I am prepared to entertain a similar motion on Mr. Cox.

Senator THURMOND. I so move.

Chairman TOWER. Any objection?

Without objection, the nomination will be favorably reported.

The roll of the committee will be held open for members of the committee who might want to vote on these nominations until the close of business today.

Two highly valued professional staff members recently left our committee to accept other positions in Government.

Tony Principi has served the committee well through his outstanding work with the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel. Tony is now serving as Deputy Administrator of the Veterans' Administration, responsible for congressional and public relations.

Steve Dotson has been a member of the staff assisting the Democratic Committee members for 4 years. Steve has analyzed a large number of R&D and procurement programs for all of the services. Steve is now serving in the Office of Management and Budget, and he continues his analysis of defense programs in that new position.

I know that all of us wish Tony and Steve the very best in their new governmental assignment.

Resolutions expressing the appreciation of the committee for their service have been prepared and circulated to each Senator, and I would ask that those resolutions be adopted, printed in the record of this hearing, and transmitted to Mr. Principi and Mr. Dotson in an appropriate form.

[The committee resolutions concerning Messrs. Principi and Dotson follow:]

COMMITTEE RESOLUTION—ANTHONY J. PRINCIPI

Whereas, Anthony J. Principi has served the Members of the Committee on Armed Services of the United States in a most admirable and commendable fashion since February 6, 1981; and

Whereas, Mr. Principi has left the Armed Services Committee staff to join the staff of the Veterans' Administration; and

Whereas, Mr. Principi has demonstrated superb analytical talents and provided well-respected professional advice during his tenure on the committee's staff; and

Whereas, Mr. Principi's contributions to the recent efforts of the committee's staff in preparing for action on the fiscal year 1984 defense budget have been most noteworthy; and

Whereas, the Members of the committee and the committee staff will miss Mr. Principi's keen insights and reasoned counsel on matters pertaining to major portions of the defense budget and national security: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Members of the Committtee on Armed Services of the United States Senate do hereby commend Anthony J. Principi for his excellent service as a member of the committee staff.

COMMITTEE RESOLUTION—ROBERT S. DOTSON

Whereas, Robert S. Dotson has served the Members of the Committee on Armed Services of the United States Senate in a most admirable and commendable fashion since January 22, 1979; and

Whereas, Mr. Dotson has left the Armed Services Committee staff to return to the Office of Management and Budget; and

Whereas, Mr. Dotson has demonstrated superb analytical talents and provided well-respected professional advice during his tenure on the committee's staff; and

Whereas, Mr. Dotson's contributions to the recent efforts of the committee's staff in preparing for action on the fiscal year 1984 defense budget have been most noteworthy; and

Whereas, the Members of the committee and the committee staff will miss Mr. Dotson's keen insights and reasoned counsel on matters pertaining to major portions of the defense budget and national security: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Members of the Committee on Armed Services of the United States Senate do hereby commend Steven Dotson for his excellent service as a member of the committee staff.

Chairman TOWER. The Chair is prepared to entertain a motion.

Senator THURMOND. I so move.

Senator NUNN. Seconded.

Chairman TOWER. Is there any objection?

Without objection, it is so ordered.

[Whereupon, at 2:46 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]

[The nominations of Gen. Paul X. Kelley, Mr. Richard L. Armitage, and Mr. Chapman B. Cox were reported to the Senate by Senator Tower on May 24, 1983, with the recommendation that the nominations be confirmed. The nominations were confirmed by the Senate on May 25, 1983.]

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